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Abstract
Regulation fostering Managed Care alternatives in health insurance is spreading. This work reports on
an experiment designed to measure the amounts of compensation asked by the Swiss population (in
terms of reduced premiums) for Managed-Care type restrictions in the provision of health care. It finds
that restrictions on the freedom of physician choice would require an average compensation of more
than one-third of the premium, while generic substitution even meets with a small willingness to pay.
Marked preference heterogeneity is an argument against regulation imposing uniformity of contract in
Swiss social health insurance.
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1 Introduction 
Health care expenditure has been soaring in all industrialized countries. The policy response 
has been of two types (Cutler, 2002). Either outright rationing (hidden or open) was imposed, 
or health insurers were mandated to introduce policies with more stringent provisions (higher 
deductibles, higher rates of coinsurance, or so-called Managed Care options such as HMOs). 
The United States has taken the latter route, resulting in more than two-third of the insured 
population being covered by some Managed Care alternative (Interstudy, 2003). Other 
countries are considering the possibility of actually forcing consumers into Managed-Care 
type contracts. The common motive for these policies is that governments, who share (e.g. 
through subsidization of hospitals) part of the burden of increasing health care expenditure, 
seek ways to alleviate this burden. The pro-choice approach seeks to motivate individuals to 
engage in self-rationing through the choice of appropriate contracts. However, the experience 
of the United States shows that restrictions particularly on free choice of physician are not 
accepted easily; in fact, consumers strongly turned against Health Maintenance Organizations, 
the most restrictive variant of Managed Care (“HMO backlash”; see e.g. The Economist, 28 
June 2001). 
Such resistance indicates that more stringent restrictions on the use of healthcare services are 
viewed as regulations, although they go along with lower premiums if imposed by 
(competitive) health insurers. Apparently, however, these premium reductions are not 
sufficient to compensate the insured for their loss of expected utility. This argument prompts a 
very simple question, viz. what is the amount of compensation necessary to overcome 
consumer resistance against more stringent regulation of health care?  
The objective of this paper is to present evidence on the likely magnitude of compensation 
required in a country whose citizens are accustomed to a great deal of choice in health care, 
similar to the United States. It reports on experiments involving the Swiss resident population 
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that are designed to measure resistance against Managed-Care type restrictions in financial 
terms. The tool used is Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE), a novel approach to preference 
and willingness-to-pay measurement that is rapidly gaining acceptance. There are three main 
findings of this study: (1) Giving up free choice of physician requires one-third of the present 
average insurance premium to be voluntarily accepted, a high but finite amount, contradicting 
traditional ideology of the Swiss (and other) medical associations claiming free choice of 
physician to be priceless; (2) The combination of restrictions typically imposed by Managed 
Care requires superadditive compensation, much as predicted by microeconomic theory; (3) 
There is strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, suggesting that uniform regulation of 
the provision of health care may impose a substantial efficiency loss on the population of even 
a small country such as Switzerland with its 7.2 mn. inhabitants. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the second section, DCE are introduced as a tool for 
preference measurement. A short literature review concerning the merits of DCE compared to 
the conventional contingent valuation (CV) alternative will be given, followed by some 
theoretical background for econometric specification. The third section informs about the 
design of the present experiment. The attributes of health care provision that are relevant to 
consumers must be identified and levels found that while not deemed unrealistic induce 
respondents to switch between the status quo and the alternatives proposed. Otherwise, 
nothing can be learned about their preferences. A description of the sample is also given. The 
fourth section contains the econometric estimates. The starting point is a basic model that 
links respondents’ change in utility simply to the differences in attributes between the status 
quo and the proposed alternatives without admitting any systematic heterogeneity in terms of 
marginal utilities of income. In a second step, socio-economic influences enter the picture, 
providing evidence of marked heterogeneity of preferences not only between language 
regions but also age and income groups. The final section presents conclusions and 
suggestions for future work. 
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2 DCE as a tool for preference measurement 
2.1 Literature review 
The method of choice for evaluating goods that are either public or not yet on the market is 
cost-benefit-analysis. Rather than relying on the human capital approach (which is not 
compatible with standard microeconomics (see e.g. Zweifel and Breyer, 1997, ch. 2), 
researchers increasingly determine the utility side of the equation using willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) estimates. Sometimes it is possible to infer these preferences from individual behavior 
on the market. However, often recourse must be had to actually asking individuals about their 
WTP. Here, the traditional approach, pioneered in environmental economics and 
transportation economics, has been CV (see e.g. the survey by Mitchell and Carson, 1989). 
The problem with CV is that all attributes of the alternative in question are kept constant, 
except price, which is rather artificial since in real life situations, available alternatives almost 
always differ from the status quo in several attributes. This artificiality of CV has several 
unwanted consequences (see Mitchell and Carson, 1989, ch. 11 for an overview). First, 
respondents seem to have the tendency to answer with yes when responding to discrete CV 
questions in order to express their motivations instead of giving their true preferences (yea-
saying). Second, compliant and strategic behaviors may lead respondents to inaccurately 
represent their preferences, because there are no incentives to tell the truth when the 
constructed market is too hypothetical. 
These disadvantages are avoided by an approach that originates from so-called conjoint 
analysis in marketing in the 1970s ( Cattin and Wittink, 1982; Gustafson et al., 2000). 
Compared to other variants, such as rating and ranking, DCE (which require respondents to 
merely indicate “accept” or “reject”, relative to the status quo) have the advantage of being 
firmly rooted in decision theory. In health economics, DCE have been applied starting in 
1990s (Ryan and Hughes, 1997; Johnson et al., 1998; Telser and Zweifel, 2002). While the 
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approach has been used for measuring WTP for specific products and procedures, the idea of 
defining an entire health care system as such a product is more recent. The first instance may 
well be Gyrd-Hansen and Slothuus (2002), who measured the preferences of the Danish 
population for a change from present tax-based financing to an alternative that would involve 
increased out-of-pocket payments. To our knowledge, however, no attempt has been made to 
date to measure the resistance of consumers against regulation in health care using the DCE 
approach. 
2.2 Theoretical background 
Following Lancaster (1966), the basic assumption is that consumers derive utility from the 
attributes they enjoy through the use of goods rather than from the quantity of goods per se. 
Therefore, the utility of consumer i who exclusively consumes good j can be written as 
( )ijijjjij szbxuU ε,,,,=         (1) 
Here, U denotes the utility, whose value is determined by a function that is identical for all 
individuals i, xj the quantity of good x in alternative j, bj the associated vector of attributes, z 
the numéraire good, and si socioeconomic characteristics of individual i. Finally, εij is a 
random variable that reflects the fact that while decisions may be deterministic, their 
determinants cannot be fully observed by the experimenter, which imparts a stochastic 
element to decision making. This specification amounts to the random utility model 
(McFadden, 1974). Due to utility maximization, the indirect utility function vij can be written 
as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )ijiijiijjjijiijjjjijiijjjij ssybpzbsybpxusybpvV εεεε ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ≡=   (2) 
with pj denoting the price for alternative j and yi the income of individual i. Focusing on the 
deterministic component of  equation (2), figure 1 can be used to illustrate the derivation of 
WTP from a series of discrete choices (i.e. yes-or-no). Two of the attributes in the present 
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context (to be described in section 3.1 below) are freedom of choice and insurance coverage 
of long-term care (LTC) expenditure. The status quo in Switzerland, symbolized by point S, is 
characterized by an essentially unconstrained choice of physician, combined with very limited 
LTC coverage. In the course of the experiment, let there be an alternative A that restricts 
choice to physicians selected by the health insurer on the basis of their quality of treatment, 
while LTC coverage is extended to include all home care. If the respondent opts in favor of 
alternative A rather than the status quo, his or her indifference curve must run below point A.  
Next, the respondent is asked to weigh alternative B, where the extension of LTC coverage 
goes along with a much more severe restriction of physician choice (viz. a selection of 
physicians based on cost considerations only). If the same respondent expresses preference in 
favor of the status quo this time, his or her indifference curve must run above point B. By 
repeating the experiment, it becomes possible to approximately construct respondents’ 
indifference curve and with it, the marginal rate of substitution between the two attributes 
considered. This means that 
( , , , , ) /
( , , , , ) /
j j j i i ij k
j j j i i ij m
v p b y s b
MRS
v p b y s b
ε
ε
∂ ∂= ∂ ∂        (3) 
can be inferred from the choice behavior of participants in a DCE. In addition, if attribute m is 
the premium reduction (and hence increase in income) associated with a restriction of 
freedom of choice, the MRS is nothing but the marginal willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
avoiding this restriction, or the other way around, the marginal compensation asked for 
accepting a regulation that limits freedom of choice in the event of illness. 
Conclusion 1: For non-marketed goods such as Managed-Care type health insurance policies, 
discrete choice experiments permit to interpolate indifference curves in 
attribute space and hence to determine relevant marginal rates of substitution. 
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Figure 1: Freedom of choice and coverage of long-term care (LTC) as attributes 
 
2.3 Stochastic specification 
The usual assumption now is that indirect utility vj can be split up in a systematic and a 
stochastic component (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1983, chap. 3), 
( , , , , ) ( , , , )j j j i i ij j j j i i iv p b y s w p b y s jε ε= +       (4) 
Now consumer i will decide in favor of alternative j if the utility associated with j exceeds the 
value associated with the status quo. Therefore, if Pij denotes the probability of choosing 
alternative j, one has 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]jlsybpwsybpw
jlsybpwsybpwP
iillliijjjijil
iliilllijiijjjij
≠∀+≤−=
≠∀+≥+=
,,,,,,,Prob
,,,,,,,Prob
εε
εε
   (5) 
For alternative j to be chosen, the systematic utility difference therefore must exceed the 
purely chance-driven difference. Implementation of this criterion requires the specification of 
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a joint density function for the stochastic term, defined over the set of scenarios. The 
multivariate normal distribution (Probit) has the advantage over extreme value distributions 
that in the multivariate case, the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives need 
not be imposed. Therefore, the (computationally more demanding) less restrictive Probit 
alternative is used in the following. In addition, a linear approximation of the systematic part 
of the utility function has been shown to usually be of sufficient precision in several empirical 
studies (Louviere et al., 2000, ch. 4). In the present context, generalizing the specification to 
include quadratic terms did not result in an improved statistical fit. The point of departure 
therefore will be an indirect utility function that is linear in the retained product attributes, 
0
1
K
j k jk p j ij
k
v b pβ β β
=
= + + +∑ ε ,   with  ijiij νηε += ,      (6) 
where the β  are parameters to be estimated, the b  the attributes (k = 1, …, K) except the 
insurance premium proposed in scenario j, 
jk
jp  the price attribute (i.e. the premium), and ijε  an 
error term consisting of an individual-specific component iη  that is the same across scenarios 
and v  a component that varies across scenarios (random-effects specification). ij
When the change of the attribute is non-marginal, WTP for the change can be approximated 
by the product of marginal WTP (MWTP) times the change in the attribute from level k0 to k* 
as follows (Hanemann, 1983), 
( ) ( ) ( )( )* 0 * 0 * 0 / / kk k k k k k k v bWTP b b b b MWTP b b v p∂ ∂ − = − ⋅ = − ⋅  − ∂ ∂     (7) 
If the WTP for the modification of several (or all) attributes has to be calculated, these WTP 
values are simply summed over all K attributes (Johnson and Desvousges, 1997), 
( )( )
( )
* 0
* 0 1
/
/
K
k k k
k
b b v b
WTP b b
v p
=
 − ∂ ∂  − =  − ∂ ∂
∑
      (8) 
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From equation (3), one knows that the negative value of the coefficient pertaining to the 
price attribute ( pβ− ) is the marginal utility of income. In a more comprehensive estimation 
including socioeconomic characteristics, marginal utilities vary with those characteristics, 
implying that marginal and total WTP values can only be calculated conditional on the values 
of these other explanatory variables. 
3 Description of the experiment 
During the Fall of 2003, 1,032 adult residents of Switzerland (excluding the Italian-speaking 
area of Ticino) were interviewed. Table 1 displays the composition of the sample, compared 
to other statistical information on the Swiss resident population where available (see Telser et 
al., 2004 for details). On the whole, there does not seem to be serious deviations of sample 
values from population values that would raise concerns about sample selection bias in 
estimation. 
For the DCE, the following attributes were retained after extensive consultations with health 
insurance and medical experts.  A crucial characteristic of  Managed-Care plans is restricted 
physician choice. The most stringent alternative is for the health insurer to select providers 
using but cost criteria by limiting its list to those who do not exceed the average of cost per 
case by a certain multiple (PHYSCOST = 1, status quo = 0). Another, less harsh variant is to 
use quality criteria such as specialty training completed and continued education effort 
(PHYSQUAL = 1). Finally, the insurer may mimic the efficiency criterion its clientele 
observes according to economic theory by checking a physician’s quality-cost ratio 
(PHYSEFF = 1). 
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Table 1:  Sample and population characteristics 
Socioeconomic 
characteristic 
Sample Population value Sources, population 
values 
Household size    
No. members 2.52 2.47 FSO ICS( 2003) 
One-person, share 24.2% 32.5% FSO ICS ( 2003) 
Education    
Compulsory schooling 8.5% 18.4% FSO ICS ( 2003) 
Vocational training 56.7% 56.4% FSO ICS ( 2003) 
University 11.6% 10.8% FSO ICS ( 2003) 
Occupational status    
Dependent 49.0% 51.0% FSO SES( 2003) 
Independent 9.7% 9.2% FSO SES( 2003) 
Retired 24.2% 20.6% FSO SES( 2003) 
Unemployed 1.6% 3.8% FOE, Oct. 2003 
Subjective health    
Excellent 41%   
Good 41%   
Fair 12%   
Medical services used, last 12 months 
None 20%   
Physician 58%   
Medication 45%   
Hospital 16%   
Currently in medical treatment    
Yes 31%   
 
Insurers also claim that granting access to new therapies and drugs with a lag of two years 
(say) would generate substantial cost savings because the cost of these innovative products 
goes down as a function of experience in use. This restriction is labeled INNOV = 1. A hotly 
debated reform proposal is to reimburse only the generic variant of a medication if available 
on the Swiss market (MEDIGEN = 1). In a similar vein, the insurer could offer a policy that 
does not provide reimbursement for ‘comfort’ drugs designed to alleviate minor health 
complaints (MEDIMIN = 1). There is one aspect of Swiss social health insurance where an 
extension of coverage is being considered by policy makers. The cost of long-term care 
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services is only covered to the extent that they are strictly medical whereas accommodation 
in a nursing home must be paid by the elderly person in principle (with social assistance 
making up for the gap if the pension is insufficient). The proposal is to make individuals aged 
50 and more pay a monthly surcharge of CHF 50 (US$ 38) to finance a LTC supplement 
(LTC = 1). Finally, small district hospitals are believed not to be cost efficient; therefore, a 
contract excluding them in favor of larger units at the regional level should achieve some 
savings (HOSP = 1). The price attribute is the monthly premium that goes along with a 
contract defined by a combination of these attributes (PREMIUM).  
4 Econometric results 
4.1 Specification comprising attributes only 
Although the theoretical example of section 2 involved coverage for LTC (see Figure 1 
again), this attribute turned out not to be positively valued. It will therefore be left out of the 
discussion in the following. However, physician choice (the other attribute used in Figure 1) 
does constitute a highly valued attribute. This can be gleaned from table 2, which shows the 
results of the regression implementing the specification of equation (5). All retained attributes 
have the expected sign and are highly significant. 
Conclusion 2: The retained attributes are (with the exception of generic substitution and 
exclusion of drugs for minor complaints) highly significant determinants of 
contract choice and hence indirect utility. 
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Table 2:  Random-effects Probit estimation, basic model 
Variable Coefficient  s.e. z P > |z| 
Physicians selected on cost (PHYSCOST) -0.9085349 *** 0.054660 -16.62 0.000 
Physicians selected on quality (PHYSQUAL) -0.4691062 *** 0.052087 -9.01 0.000 
Physicians selected on efficiency (PHYSEFF) -0.3691041 *** 0.053688 -6.87 0.000 
2 years for new therapies (INNOV) -0.5686612 *** 0.038207 -14.88 0.000 
Generics only (MEDIGEN) -0.0235289  0.048101 -0.49 0.625 
No drugs, minor complaints (MEDIMIN) 0.0569549  0.046406 1.23 0.220 
LTC financed by 50+ (LTC) -0.219003 *** 0.038198 -5.73 0.000 
Restricted hospital list (HOSP) -0.3281199 *** 0.037891 -8.66 0.000 
Health insurance premium (PREM) -0.008797 *** 0.000983 -8.95 0.000 
Estimated constant (CONST) -0.5124295 *** 0.079204 -6.47 0.000 
σu 1.052211  0.039998   
ρ 0.5254248 *** 0.018957   
Number of observations = 9850 
χ2 (9) = 573.65; Prob > χ2  = 0.0000 
Likelihood ratio test of ρ = 0: χ2 (1) = 1487.86; Prob > = χ2  = 0.000 
* (**, ***) Coefficient differs from zero at the 5% (1%, 0.1%) significance level. 
 
From the estimated coefficients shown in Table 2, WTP values (or rather, compensation 
values, often called willingness to accept) can be calculated. The results for four envisaged 
regulatory restrictions are displayed in  Table 3. To put these estimates in perspective, note 
that the nationwide average premiums as of 2003 is CHF 270 (US$208). The standard errors 
are calculated using the Delta method. 
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Table 3: Compensation asked for regulatory restrictions, Switzerland (2003) 
Amounts in CHF / month 
Socioeconomic  
characteristics 
Physicians  
selected on 
cost 
 criteria 
 
 
(1) 
Physicians  
selected on  
quality  
criteria 
 
 
(2) 
Physicians  
selected on 
cost and 
quality 
criteria 
 
(3) 
Access to 
new 
therapies 
and drugs 
delayed by 
2 yrs  
(4) 
Reimburse-
ment of 
generics 
only  
 
 
(5) 
No reimburse-
ment of drugs 
for minor 
complaints  
 
 
(6) 
No small 
local 
hospitals  
 
 
 
(7) 
Total sample 103 (13.2) 53 (8.8) 42 (7.8) 65 (7.9) 3 (5.5) -6 (5.3) 37 (5.7) 
Gender 
Female 117(23.8) 66 (16.3) 57 (14.5) 68 (13.3) 4 (9.2) -12 (9.1) 48 (10.8) 
Male 93 (15.5) 43 (10.3) 30 (8.9) 63 (9.9) 1 (6.8) -3 (6.7) 29 (6.5) 
Age 
25-39 81 (11.72) 33 (7.8) 29 (7.4) 45 (6.7) 9 (5.9) -2 (5.6) 33 (5.8) 
40-64 136 (35.2) 72 (22.5) 60 (19.8) 101 (24.5) -4 (11.9) -14 (11.9) 46 (13.7) 
65+ 153 (85.8) 133 (77.2) 76 (49.6) 83 (45.6) -24 (27.8) -19 (26.9) 36 (26.3) 
Region 
German-
speaking 
88 (11.8) 38 (7.7) 26 (6.8) 56 (7.1) 5 (5.5) -5 (5.3) 31 (5.2) 
French-
speaking 
191 (76.3) 138 (58.5) 136 (56.9) 117 (45.4) -14 (19.6) -13 (19.2) 74 (31.0) 
Average monthly income per household member 
< CHF 1500 67 (17.5) 44 (14.7) 35 (13.4) 52 (12.2) -5 (10.0) -2 (9.7) 28 (9.1) 
CHF 1500 to 
4000 
108 (17.5) 56 (11.6) 42 (9.9) 66 (10.3) 9 (7.2) -5 (6.8) 42 (7.8) 
CHF 4000+ 148 (55.8) 62 (29.9) 63 (29.7) 81 (29.4) -14 (17.5) -18 (17.8) 33 (16.8) 
Health status 
Healthy 99 (14.1) 44 (9.0) 37 (8.3) 60 (8.3) 0 (6.1) -11 (6.0) 39 (6.4) 
In treatment 117 (32.9) 83 (26.0) 57 (20.1) 82 (21.7) 10 (12.8) +21 (12.4) 34 (12.5) 
Hospital, last 12 
months 
160 (81.2) 70 (43.7) 56 (38.9) 118 (57.4) 28 (28.0) -24 (25.5) 87 (44.8) 
Note: 1 CHF equals 0.77 US$ at 2003 exchange rates. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Reading table 3 horizontally first, one notes that the amounts of compensation asked are 
consistently highest for consenting to a physician list based exclusively on cost criteria 
(PHYSCOST). The sample average is as high as CHF 103, or some 38 percent of the 
country’s average monthly premium. Still, the fact that it is finite speaks against the claim 
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(often advanced by medical associations worldwide) that free choice of physician is 
virtually priceless. 
If insurers were to select participating physicians according to quality criteria (PHYSQUAL), 
compensations required drop by some 50 percent on average to CHF 53 (and even 60 percent 
among those aged 25-39, to CHF 33). This does not come as a surprise in a highly insured 
system, where a low rate of coinsurance (10 percent on ambulatory care) encourages patients 
to emphasize quality in their choices. However, the drop in compensation asked is even more 
marked if the envisaged criteria for selecting physicians are both quality and cost, which 
amounts to an efficiency criterion (PHYSEFF). This may be astonishing at first sight; 
however, PHYSEFF implies that the insurer would be applying exactly the same criteria as 
consumers, the only difference being that insured consumers would use net cost (after 
insurance) rather than full cost. The health insurer therefore would come close to acting as a 
perfect agent whose decisions should meet with little resistance by principals. 
Delaying access to new therapies and drugs by two years (col. 4) would have to be 
compensated very highly, too. This makes sense because this is a restriction that applies 
across the board, regardless of the type of therapy (pharmaceutical vs. medical) and the 
setting (ambulatory care vs. hospital care). By way of contrast, a drug benefit restricted to 
generics if available (col. 5) does not even call for a compensation within certain subgroups. 
There are two likely reasons for this. First, generic drug substitution has been enjoying an 
increasing degree of acceptance, and second, relatively few original drugs have admitted 
generic substitutes in Switzerland (their market share being less than 5 percent), which means 
that the corresponding restriction would not be binding very often. When it comes to do 
without reimbursement of drugs that help against minor complaints (col. 6) the Swiss 
population even seem to exhibit a small positive WTP for such a restriction. This can be 
interpreted as an instance of ‘warm glow’, i.e. the tendency of (at least some) respondents to 
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choose alternatives they believe to be socially acclaimed (Andreoni, 1995). This ‘warm 
glow’ effect already disappears, however, with those more likely affected (currently in 
treatment) exhibiting a positive average amount of compensation asked. Finally, 
compensation necessary to make the insured accept having their choice of hospital restricted 
(by closing inefficient small local units, col. 7) attains values that come close to those of col. 3 
(physician list on efficiency criteria). Once more, this has an economic interpretation. On the 
one hand, an illness calling for hospitalization usually is well beyond a minor complaint, 
justifying higher values than those of col. 6 of Table 3. Also, substitution of a central for a 
local hospital quite likely entails a greater sacrifice than substituting a generic for a branded 
drug (col. 5) in these urgent circumstances. On the other hand, the technology available in the 
two types of hospital is roughly comparable, whereas lacking access to the newest medical 
and pharmaceutical technologies for two years may entail a marked loss of quality of life in 
some situations, a fact that is compatible with the values of col. 7 falling somewhat short of 
those shown in col. 4 of Table 3. 
When reading Table 3 vertically, one finds clear evidence of preference heterogeneity. Not 
surprisingly, regulation restricting physician choice on cost criteria (col. 1 of Table 3) would 
meet with particularly strong resistance among the 65+ age group and those having been in 
hospital recently. Compensations demanded are 46 and 55 percent higher than average, 
respectively. However, the most salient heterogeneity seems to be a cultural one in that the 
French-speaking minority exhibits a value that exceeds the average by even 85 percent. 
Similar but even more marked differences emerge with regard to the other restrictions of 
physician choice proposed. For example, when it comes to a selection based on efficiency 
criteria (col. 3), the French-speaking require even more than the triple of the average amount 
of monthly compensation (CHF 136 vs. 42) for acceptance. When it comes to delayed access 
to new therapies and drugs (col. 4), this would be resisted most strongly by the 40-64 years 
old rather than the oldest and among individuals with high income (4000+ CHF per month). 
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This is less of a surprise than the observation that the compensation necessary to overcome 
such a regulatory measure would again have to be twice as high for the French-speaking than 
for the German-speaking population. In relative terms, this cultural divide is at least as 
marked when it comes to accepting generics rather than original drugs and to do without 
reimbursement of drugs that help against minor complaints (col. 5 and 6). 
Finally, preference heterogeneity shows up importantly again in col. 7 of Table 3. In spite of a 
hospital density of 0.8 per 10,000 population, one of the highest figures of the world (OECD, 
2003), women are willing to pay the substantial amount of an estimated CHF 48 (US$ 37) per 
month to preserve access to local hospitals. This is understandable because of the importance 
of maternity services to them. Apart from the language divide, those having experienced 
hospital treatment during the recent past tend to also have higher WTP for continued access to 
local hospitals. 
Conclusion 3: Socioeconomic characteristics are associated with marked differences in 
required compensations for regulatory restrictions that are interpretable in 
terms of economic theory. Moreover, regional differences point to considerable 
preference heterogeneity that likely is culturally determined. 
4.3 Resistance against combined restrictions 
Reforms of the healthcare sector usually proceed in packages which amount to a combination 
of cutbacks (Cutler, 2003). To the extent that the restrictions considered in the present paper 
all amount to a loss of freedom of choice, the convexity of the indifference curve can be used 
to infer that compensation asked for two restrictions combined will exceed the sum of the 
compensations for each measure separately (see Figure 1 again).  
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Table 4: Compensations asked for combined restrictions, Switzerland (2003) 
No. Choice of 
physician 
Access to new 
therapies and drugs 
Choice of drugs Choice of 
hospital 
Compensation 
asked per month 
1 List based on 
quality criteria 
No change Generics only 
(if available) 
No change from 
status quo 
CHF 114 
2 No change from 
status quo 
Delay of 2 years Generics only 
(if available) 
No change from 
status quo 
CHF 126 
3 List based on cost 
and quality criteria 
No change from status 
quo 
No reimbursement in 
case of minor complaint 
No local hospitals CHF 131 
4 List based on cost 
criteria 
Delay of 2 years No reimbursement in 
case of minor complaint 
No local hospitals CHF 257 
 
Table 4 contains evidence to the effect that combining restrictions indeed causes 
compensation asked to increase in a super-additive manner. For example, the mild restrictions 
contained in combination No. 1 (physician list based on quality criteria, generic substitution 
where possible, no change from status quo otherwise) calls forth a compensation of CHF 114 
per month. This substantially exceeds the sum of the respective amounts shown in cols. 2 and 
5 of Table 3 (56 = 53 + 3). Superadditivity is however less marked when three restrictions are 
combined, as in the particularly harsh combination No. 4 of table 4 (physician list based on 
cost criteria, delayed access to innovation, no reimbursement of drugs for the treatment of 
minor complaints, no local hospitals). This regulatory package would have to be compensated 
with CHF 257, whereas the sum of compensations (taken from cols. 1, 4, 6, and 7 of table 3) 
amounts to CHF 199 (=103 + 65 – 6 + 37). However, combined restrictions do require 
superadditive compensation without exception. This is importantly due to the fact that when 
combining attributes to a product, the constant of eq. (6) enters the calculation. A changing 
constant can impart proximate convexity to the indifference curve (which is locally linearized 
in the Probit estimation of Table 2). In sum, the estimates shown in Table 4 suggest that 
piecemeal regulation may meet with less resistance than entire packages, at least in the case of 
health care. 
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4.4 Dispersion of WTP estimates 
An important piece of evidence regarding preference heterogeneity is provided by an analysis 
of  the distribution of WTP estimates. As shown in Table 5, the lowest quartiles and deciles 
are at a considerable distance from the overall mean value of WTP. For example, while on 
average the compensation demanded for voluntary accepting a physician list based on cost 
criteria only (PHYSCOST) amounts to CHF 103, the lowest quartile is at CHF 76 and lowest 
decile even at CHF 59 or some 22 percent of average premium, a clear sign of preference 
heterogeneity.  Independent research suggests that the short to medium term savings 
associated with such a restriction can be as high as 50 percent, while federal regulation 
permits insurers to lower premiums only by 20 percent during the first five years following 
the launch of a Managed-Care alternative (Lehmann and Zweifel, 2004). Therefore, the 
market share of this HMO-type contract should be somewhat less than 10 percent; it in fact 
hovers around 6 percent (Swiss Federal Agency for Social Insurance, 2003, item KV 5.2). 
Preference heterogeneity is even more marked with regard to a physician list based on  
efficiency criteria (PHYSEFF). Here, the average WTP value is 42, while it falls to a mere 
CHF 10 (roughly 25 percent of the mean) for the lowest decile of the distribution. 
 
Table 5 Compensation asked for regulatory restrictions: means, lowest quartiles, lowest deciles (CHF / month) 
Restrictions proposed Mean value Lowest quartile Lowest decile 
Physicians selected on cost (PHYSCOST) 103 76 59 
Physicians selected on quality (PHYSQUAL) 53 26 17 
Physicians selected on efficiency (PHYSEFF) 42 18 10 
2 years for new therapies (INNOV) 65 43 35 
Generics only (MEDIGEN) 3 -12 -36 
No drugs, minor complaints (MEDIMIN) -6 -23 -41 
Restricted hospital list (HOSP) 37 29 15 
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Conclusion 4: Amounts of compensation asked tend to increase progressively when 
restrictions are combined, as predicted by theory. Also, a high degree of 
dispersion in the distribution of estimated WTP values points to marked 
preference heterogeneity.  
5 Conclusions 
Regulation tends to burden both producers and consumers with efficiency losses. 
Nevertheless, it may be justified if it helps to avoid or reduce externalities. In this case, 
observing market behavior for inferring efficiency losses constitutes an imperfect guide for 
policy. In the context of health care, the externality to be considered is moral hazard, which 
can be controlled by imposing restrictions on the choice of health care providers and therapies 
covered by insurance. Therefore, it may be inappropriate to use observed behaviour of 
patients and healthcare providers for designing reforms. When such restrictions are in the 
planning stage, behavior under regulation cannot be observed. In this situation, the use of 
experiments simulating market behavior can provide valuable guidance. 
The discrete choice experiments reported here have the advantage of realism (Conclusion 1). 
They are realistic because respondents had to decide between a fixed status quo and a series 
of alternatives that change in all relevant product attributes, not only price (as in contingent 
valuation). They are realistic also because under the pressure of competition, insurers who 
successfully control moral hazard (thus achieving a cost advantage) will have to offer lower 
premiums. In the case of Switzerland, this scenario is credible because contracts already exist 
that offer a premium reduction in return for certain restrictions of the managed-care type 
(Lehmann and Zweifel, 2004). It may be this realism that contributed to a very low rate of 
refusals in the experiment and clear evidence in favor of trade-offs between non-price and 
price attributes of the proposed alternatives. 
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The great majority of the regulatory restrictions considered do impart utility losses to 
respondents (Conclusion 2). Compensations required to make respondents voluntarily accept 
these restriction can be shown to importantly differ between groups. The highest 
compensation asked pertains to restrictions of physician choice; however these amounts are 
finite, and at least for some segments of the insured population, the achievable cost savings 
suffice to finance them. In particular, this refutes the claim often advanced by the medical 
profession that free physician choice is virtually priceless. Indeed, immediate access to new 
therapies and drugs seem to command a comparable value, at least in the case of the Swiss 
population. 
To the extent that the aged may be exposed to increased health risk, against which they want 
to buy health insurance coverage, microeconomic theory predicts their compensation to be 
higher than average (Arrow, 1971, ch. 3). This prediction is borne out in all the variants of 
physician lists considered here. While no economic predictions can be made regarding the 
ceteris paribus-difference between the German-speaking and French-speaking regions, the 
fact that compensations asked are up to five times higher in the French-speaking region point 
to a great deal of preference heterogeneity. Turning to income, the general pattern conforms 
to economic predictions in that higher income is associated with higher compensation asked 
for a good such as freedom of choice, which must be particularly valuable when financial 
constraints are not so binding. Not surprisingly, those having undergone either ambulatory or 
hospital treatment in the recent past put a particularly high value on unrestricted choice of 
physician (Conclusion 3). Finally, the marked dispersion characterizing the distribution of 
estimated WTP values, with the lowest decile 50 percent or even 25 percent of the mean, also 
suggests marked heterogeneity of preferences in the Swiss population concerning the 
provision of health care (Conclusion 4). 
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This preference heterogeneity militates against the introduction of regulation imposing 
uniform Managed-Care type policies on health insurers and hence consumers. Rather, insurers 
need the freedom to develop policies that match the preferences of subsets of the population, 
to whom they are able to offer a premium reduction corresponding to the amount of 
compensation asked for accepting the pertinent restrictions on the provision of health care. 
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